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ABSTRACT 
In Human, All-Too-Human, Nietzsche initiates an unexpected criticism of art, specifically 
a criticism of its ability to help humans justify life in a world full of suffering. Nietzsche sets his 
sights on absolute music, music that perpetuates religious values inherited from Christianity and 
renders the modern listener unable to affirm life. Drawing from various sources in nineteenth-
century Germany, including his former friend Richard Wagner, Nietzsche demonstrates that rather 
than relying on absolute music to help us come to terms with suffering, we must abandon it in 
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To my father, whose passion for music has passed to me through blood, a passion that 
now inspires me to distrust its source.
v 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Music seems to have a unique power over us. It can deeply influence how we feel, “speak” 
to us in an intimate way, even bewitch us. Music’s ability to inspire us has long been greeted, by 
musician and listener alike, with celebration and wonder. Even skeptics, who believe music’s 
power over us is not as wonderful or as universal as others believe, continue to listen to music 
with joy. But should music’s influence on us be cause for concern? Should we not also wonder 
how music’s spellbinding powers may be influencing our deepest values, how music may in fact 
be causing us to devalue or forget things that are important to us? Music may seem so wonderful 
that we listen to it in order to escape our imperfect lives, to feel a part of some transcendent realm 
that is free from the ugliness of our present condition. Rather than value anything in day-to-day 
existence, we throw it all aside in favor of some unparalleled beauty that music seems to express.  
Once an unabashed celebrator of music’s unique powers, Nietzsche began to take these 
concerns seriously. Listening to the music of his own time, from the grand symphonies of 
Beethoven to the dramas of his soon-to-be enemy, Richard Wagner, Nietzsche found cause for 
concern. He was troubled both by the state of modern music and by the direction that it was taking. 
In 1878 Nietzsche sounded the alarm. No longer celebrating the wonders of modern music, he 
insisted that such music is symptomatic of our turning away from life, of devaluing our own 
sensible existence. 
Nietzsche’s 1878 Human, All-Too-Human (HH) offers a sobering reexamination of the art 
he had championed only a short time earlier, notably in The Birth of Tragedy (BT). In HH 
Nietzsche explores the nature and influence of absolute music in aphorisms 215–217. Whereas in 
other parts of HH Nietzsche focuses on the artist and composer, in these aphorisms Nietzsche 
closely examines the listener, specifically the roles of the listener’s intellect and senses. Nietzsche 
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claims that listeners in the nineteenth century, compared to listeners in antiquity, have a radically 
different way of hearing sounds. In antiquity, listeners’ reactions to sounds depended primarily on 
how these sounds impacted the senses, and the intellect played little to no role. Over thousands of 
years the intellect’s role increased. As a result of this development, listeners’ reactions to music 
now depend primarily on the intellect, and these listeners are increasingly unable to appreciate 
music based on how it impacts their senses.  
For Nietzsche, the changing roles of the intellect and the senses are far from 
inconsequential; those changes have tracked a significant shift in how listeners value life itself. 
Nietzsche claims that absolute music encourages listeners to value a reality beyond the sensible 
world. “Absolute music” generally refers to music that expresses meaning independent of extra-
musical elements, such as words, scenery, or a story. Importantly for Nietzsche, in the 
nineteenth-century absolute music was also closely associated with transcendence; absolute 
music expressed a divine “absolute” that transcended man-made ideas. The importance of 
absolute music for Nietzsche, and his reason for criticizing it, is better understood through 
Nietzsche’s more well-known assault on morality and its Christian foundations. We should keep 
in mind that Nietzsche’s criticism of Christian values was not unconditional but was motivated 
by his concern for their psychological influence in modern society. Whereas in earlier stages of 
Christianity, Christian values were bearable because of the widespread and genuine belief in the 
Christian doctrine, such as a benevolent god and the promise of salvation, most people in modern 
European society, according to Nietzsche, no longer maintained a belief in such doctrines. 
Modern people inherited the Christian values without a set of beliefs to make such values 
bearable. The now negative psychological influence of Christian values led Nietzsche to seek 
new values that could help people once again affirm life. 
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Even in HH, Nietzsche is concerned with the harm that morality, rooted in Christianity, 
has on psychological health. A chief value of Christianity, the rejection of nature, including our 
own natural desires, in favor of a transcendent and perfect god beyond this world, came to define 
the values of morality as well. These moral values promote what Christian values had promoted: 
self-condemnation, a sense of worthlessness, and a rejection of the natural world in favor of a 
transcendent one. Morality then was riddled with values that caused people to reject life, to see 
themselves as worthless. However, morality is not the only thing to have its root in Christian 
values; these same values came to animate art as well. Far from a coincidence, European art had 
developed within Christian society for more than a millennium, becoming inseparable from the 
beliefs and values this religion espoused. Even if such Christian values are not explicit in art, as 
they often failed to be in morality, these hidden values, what Nietzsche would later refer to as 
“ascetic ideals,” remain at work in art, including the sounds of modern music. These values that 
encourage the rejection of the sensible world, along with an overactive intellect and weakened 
senses, render listeners of absolute music in the nineteenth century unable to connect positively to 
the world in such a way that life appears worth living; absolute music threatens the listener’s ability 
to affirm life.  
Many scholars who have written about Nietzsche’s view of aesthetic value and experience 
have noted and attempted to explain his new and critical view of music and art generally in HH, 
something Nietzsche himself did in his 1886 preface to this work. Many scholars have even pointed 
out Nietzsche’s rising doubts about art’s ability to help humans affirm life, as well as his criticism 
of art because of its inheritance and perpetuation of Christian values.1 Almost all of these 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of Nietzsche’s criticism of art’s ability to help humans affirm life in HH, see 
especially Young (1992) and Pothen (2002). For a discussion of Nietzsche’s criticism of art’s 
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discussions also emphasize how HH constitutes Nietzsche’s break with the views of Richard 
Wagner. An influential German composer, dramatist, and theorist of art in nineteenth-century 
Europe, Wagner was a close and influential friend of Nietzsche’s prior to the publication of HH. 
Wagner strongly believed that a new form of art, specifically his musical dramas based upon the 
Attic tragedy, could transform the values of European society to more positive, life-affirming ones. 
Even though Nietzsche had strongly endorsed Wagner’s views about art in previous works, such 
as BT and Richard Wagner in Bayreuth (RB), many scholars emphasize that Nietzsche rejects 
Wagner’s views about art (even Wagner’s own art) in HH. Rather than supporting Wagner’s 
attempt to bring about life-affirming values through art, in HH Nietzsche rejects the claim that art 
could accomplish such a feat.  
Within these well-known discussions, fewer scholars have considered Nietzsche’s analysis 
of the audience of art, such as the listener, and those who do consider these topics seldom note the 
roles of the audience’s intellect and senses.2 While the audience’s intellect and senses are not the 
most prominent topics of discussion in Nietzsche’s criticism of art in HH, I argue that focusing on 
how their roles change in the listener and relate to the listener’s ability to affirm life can help shed 
light on Nietzsche’s break with Wagner’s views about art and the extent to which Nietzsche rejects 
the notion that art is a means by which humans affirm life. 
My examination of the changing roles of the intellect and the senses will help illuminate 
the extent to which Nietzsche’s ideas in HH are indebted to Wagner’s own views. Although it is 
often accepted that HH represents Nietzsche’s break with Wagner’s views on art, I claim that 
                                                 
Christian inheritance and perpetuation of Christian values see especially Ridley (2007) and Franco 
(2011).  
2 One scholar who does note the role of the intellect in an analysis of HH is Matthew Meyer, who 
mentions it in passing when discussing aphorism 215 (Meyer 2019: 107-108).  
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Nietzsche maintains some key Wagnerian views in aphorisms 215 and 217, such as Wagner’s 
account of art’s historical development, views that Nietzsche uses to argue against other views 
that Wagner holds. I further claim that the views Nietzsche inherits from Wagner are not mere 
tools of polemics, views that Nietzsche employs to counter Wagner and then discards after use, 
but instead constitute an important part of Nietzsche’s view of art in HH. Therefore, even though 
HH is Nietzsche’s “break-away” work from Wagner, it is also significantly continuous with 
Wagner’s views.3 
Furthermore, an examination of the changing roles of the listener’s intellect and senses 
helps to demonstrate the strength of Nietzsche’s belief that modern music is not life-affirming. 
Many scholars claim that even in HH, Nietzsche still believes that art has the ability to help humans 
affirm life.4 Many scholars hold this view because Nietzsche has positive views of art in the works 
both preceding and following HH. The abundance of positive views about art in other works leads 
many scholars to interpret Nietzsche’s criticisms of art in HH not as serious attacks on art as a 
whole, but as criticisms of certain kinds of art and artists. Furthermore, they claim that in HH 
Nietzsche maintains the view that art helps humans affirm life. This view allows scholars to claim 
                                                 
3 Carl Dahlhaus (1974) recognized that Nietzsche used Wagner’s ideas against other views that 
Wagner held as early as 1871 in “On Music and Words”. Dahlhaus argues that Nietzsche’s 
adherence to Wagner’s views is not a polemical tactic, but rather demonstrates Nietzsche’s 
agreement with part of Wagner’s account that Nietzsche believed was incompatible with other 
views that Wagner held. However, what Nietzsche is arguing against in 1871 is entirely different 
than his target in HH. In “On Music and Words” Nietzsche is defending the claim that music has 
metaphysical significance, very similar to his claims in BT. He accuses Wagner of attributing too 
much importance to poetry. However, in HH Nietzsche’s claims are reversed; he not only rejects 
the metaphysical significance of music, but argues that people, including Wagner, have attributed 
too much importance to music, the meaning of which ultimately depends on poetry.  
4 Ridley (2007) offers the strongest position about Nietzsche’s continuing faith in art’s ability to 
help humans affirm life in HH. Weaker forms of this view can be found in Meyer (2019) and 
Young (1992).  
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that Nietzsche maintained the view that art helps humans affirm life throughout his career, 
resolving inconsistencies that seem to exist between Nietzsche’s works. 
I argue to the contrary that Nietzsche’s account of the listener’s intellect and senses shows 
that modern music is simply unable to help humans affirm life. While I specifically discuss modern 
music, I believe that my account will implicate other modern types of art as well, thereby 
challenging scholars who claim that Nietzsche maintains a positive view of art in HH for its ability 
to help humans affirm life. Rather than using other works of Nietzsche to justify this claim, I will 
be focusing specifically on HH to show that its views cannot be harmonized with the views he 
espouses in earlier and later works.   
Both of these points contribute to a larger debate about the continuity (or lack thereof) of 
HH with Nietzsche’s earlier works, especially BT, and the works that follow HH. Nietzsche’s 
persistent adherence to key Wagnerian views in HH can help demonstrate the ways in which HH 
is continuous in important ways with BT. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s thorough and far-reaching 
criticisms of art in HH create a significant tension with Nietzsche’s views of art in later works. In 
the works following HH Nietzsche claims that art is able to help humans affirm life. Scholars who 
defend the continuity in Nietzsche’s views between HH and later works, whether about art (Pothen 
2002) or in general (Meyer 2019), are challenged by my account.   
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2 NIETZSCHE ON ART’S PURPOSE 
Nietzsche’s concern with the influence of absolute music in HH indicates an important 
shift from his view of art in BT. In this earlier work, Nietzsche claims that art makes life bearable 
in spite of the fact that life is filled with suffering.5 Nietzsche did not mean by this that art is a 
pleasant distraction from suffering, allowing us to forget life’s miseries from time to time. Rather, 
art could help humans embrace life, to think it worth living. Therefore, Nietzsche held that art had 
the ability to change pessimistic views about life, namely the view that life is not worth living 
because of the suffering within it. This is a view Nietzsche attributes to contemporary European 
society and which he seeks to address. BT is an attempt to show how art could help modern 
European society overcome this pessimism. Citing the Greeks as an example of a culture that 
employed art successfully in this way, BT focuses on how following the Greek’s use of art could 
once again help the modern man affirm life.  
In HH Nietzsche’s once-powerful enthusiasm for art’s ability to help humans affirm life is 
replaced by a deep skepticism toward anything that claims such an ability, art included. Even in 
BT, art was supposed to help the modern human overcome the values of Christianity by creating 
new values that would promote the affirmation of life, values that could replace the older Christian 
values that now hinder one’s ability to find life bearable. However, in HH Nietzsche realizes that 
modern art does no such thing. Rather, modern art only perpetuates these values, preventing 
humans from finding a new and effective way to affirm life. Taking a naturalist approach in HH, 
Nietzsche examines the psychological underpinnings of aesthetic experience. Tracking the close 
relationship between art and Christianity in the past, Nietzsche demonstrates that art encourages 
                                                 
5 Nietzsche brings up this view of art from the very beginning of BT, in the “Foreword to Richard 
Wagner”.  
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the same values that Christianity does. The realization that art encourages the very values that it 
was supposed to overcome led Nietzsche to break with Wagner and to challenge his previous belief 
that art is able to help humans affirm life. 
It is important to note that in HH Nietzsche continues to hold that the purpose of art is to 
help humans affirm life, even though he has become skeptical of its capacity to do so. However, 
Nietzsche’s main aim through much of HH is not to state what art’s purpose is, nor to endorse the 
use of art for dealing with life. Instead, Nietzsche evaluates whether various forms of art actually 
succeed in fulfilling this purpose.6 Nietzsche’s evaluation of absolute music is based on his 
skepticism about its ability to fulfill its purpose of helping listeners affirm life. 
3 ABSOLUTE MUSIC 
Even though Richard Wagner coined the term “absolute music” in 1846, the concept of 
absolute music can be traced back to the works of Schelling, Wackenroder, and Tieck in the late 
eighteenth century.7 The general definition of absolute music I offered earlier can be attributed to 
Romantic theorists who also preceded Wagner, such as E.T.A. Hoffman. This general definition 
stated that absolute music was able to express meaning independent of extra-musical elements, 
and in the nineteenth century was believed to express the “absolute.” This definition includes two 
aspects that are important for understanding absolute music. The first aspect is absolute music’s 
autonomy; its ability expresses meaning independent of extra-musical elements (such as words). 
The second aspect is absolute music’s ability to express the absolute. In order to understand 
                                                 
6 Nietzsche comes close to describing art’s purpose in aphorism 154 where he once again considers 
the Greeks, stating that they “knew that even misery could become enjoyment [Genüsse] solely 
through art”.  
7 Bonds (2014, pp. 132-134).  
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Wagner’s later use of the term, his views of absolute music, and how Nietzsche reacted to 
Wagner’s views, we must first examine these two aspects. 
A musical work is autonomous if its effect and significance do not include or depend on 
extra-musical elements, such as words, images, or gestures. Autonomy implies that music’s effect 
and significance depend solely on musical elements, which include chords, rhythms, cadences, 
and so forth. Absolute music is autonomous because it neither refers to nor draws from anything 
outside of music, such as a theme, a story, or a scene. Music that is “about” something outside of 
itself fails to be autonomous and would therefore fail to be absolute. Instrumental music that lacks 
a title, program, and any other extra-musical element is often cited as a form of absolute music, a 
famous example of which is Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony.  
The distinction between absolute music and program music is often cited to demonstrate 
this point. Originally the term “program music” referred to music for which an explanatory 
program was written, something the audience would read prior to a performance. This program 
would explain what the music was about, providing a literary or explanatory background that 
would connect the music to a certain story or theme. An example of this would be Liszt’s 
symphonic poem Orpheus, which was first performed in 1854. Liszt wrote a program for this work 
describing the key themes from the tale of Orpheus that motivated his work. The intent was that 
the audience would read this program and interpret the music through these stated themes (Glass 
2020). Because Liszt’s musical work relied on an extra-musical element, a descriptive program, 
in order to have a certain significance to the audience, this work is not autonomous. Therefore, it 
is not absolute music. It is important to note that instrumental music does not automatically qualify 
as absolute music. Liszt’s Orpheus was performed solely by instruments, lacking words or scenery 
during the performance. What made it “program music” was the additional program connecting it 
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to the tale of Orpheus. Therefore, music that is instrumental could still fail to be absolute if there 
are any extra-musical elements added to aid in its effect or significance.  
Views about absolute music in nineteenth-century Germany included this notion of 
autonomy, but the term “absolute” had much stronger connotations.8 Strongly influenced by 
Romanticism, absolute music draws its meaning from notions of the “absolute.” The “absolute” 
refers to something ultimate and supersensible. It does not depend on anything else, but rather is 
the basis upon which everything else depends. It cannot be grasped by thought or language, though 
it has some transcendent meaning, often likened to a divine truth, and was often taken to be an 
expression of some ultimate or higher metaphysical reality. For many in nineteenth-century 
Germany, absolute music was “absolute” not merely because it was autonomous, but because it 
revealed the absolute to listeners. Many writers, such as E.T.A. Hoffmann, believed that absolute 
music had a unique connection to the absolute. Only absolute music could express the absolute, 
which was believed to be ungraspable by thought and language.9 Therefore, absolute music was 
not merely autonomous; it expressed the absolute, the ultimate and ungraspable, which nothing 
outside of absolute music could achieve.   
Entering the German musical scene after Romantic views such as Hoffmann’s had become 
popular, Wagner quickly challenged the value of absolute music. In his 1846 program to 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, the piece in which Wagner coins the term “absolute music,” 
Wagner claims that Beethoven’s final symphony has overcome absolute music, representing a 
                                                 
8 The following is taken from Fürbeth and Sorgner (2010, pp. 12-14).  
9 Thinkers disputed the means by which the absolute was expressed. Some emphasized that the 
absolute was expressed via untranslatable emotions conjured up in the listeners. Other views 
emphasized the fact that the formal qualities of music, which could not be translated into language, 
were able to express the absolute. For a further discussion of the various means by which the 
absolute was expressed, see section three below. 
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transition from absolute music to a music of the future. For Wagner, absolute music is not 
something to be pursued but left behind as a relic of the past.10   
 Wagner’s dismissal of absolute music as something to be overcome was supported by his 
belief that autonomous music was deficient in what it could express. Wagner made these views 
explicit in two of his most famous writings on aesthetics: Artwork of the Future (1850) and Opera 
and Drama (1852). For Wagner, autonomous music could at best evoke vague and general 
emotions in the listener, but it was unable to communicate something that the listener could 
understand. Rather, autonomous music should be unified with other kinds of art, such as the art of 
dance and the art of prose, in order to communicate meaning effectively. This unification is exactly 
what Wagner planned to achieve in his own “artwork of the future,” variously referred to as a total 
work of art [Gesamtkunstwerk], as a drama, and by later writers as a musical drama 
[Musikdrama].11  Only when all the various forms of art are integrated with one another could 
music effectively express meaning that the audience could understand. Consequently, Wagner 
firmly rejected the belief that autonomous music had a higher value than music combined with 
other forms of art, and he was highly critical of the claim that absolute music could somehow 
express something ungraspable by language.  
Wagner’s rejection of absolute music seems to be behind Nietzsche’s own concise 
definition of absolute music at the end of aphorism 216: “music in which everything is at once 
understood symbolically without further assistance” (HH 216). Nietzsche’s definition is neither a 
                                                 
10 “Bericht über die Aufführung der Neunten Symphonie von Beethoven im Jahre 1846 in Dresden 
nebst Programm dazu” in Wagner, Richard (1983) Dichtungen und Schriften, Vol. 9, pp. 12-28.  
11 Wagner was critical of this last term. For more information see Wagner’s “Über die Bennenung 
‘Musikdrama’” in Wagner, Richard (1983) Dichtungen und Schriften, Vol. 9, pp. 271-277. 
Examples of such “artworks of the future” include Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, der Ring der 
Nibelungen, and Parsifal.  
12 
wholesale rejection nor acceptance of Wagner’s position. Nietzsche’s definition agrees with 
Wagner’s view insofar as it states that in absolute music, everything is understood symbolically 
[symbolisch verstanden]. For Nietzsche, the claim that absolute music is understood symbolically 
means that it is understood linguistically; the meaning of absolute music is derived from language. 
What absolute music expresses is not something ineffable and ungraspable, but something that 
originates in thought and language. The definition Nietzsche offers seems indebted to Wagner’s 
own views, namely that language has to play some sort of role if music is to express meaning.  
However, in the very same sentence in which Nietzsche seems to agree with Wagner, 
Nietzsche challenges Wagner as well—Nietzsche claims that music can express some form of 
meaning that the listener understands without further assistance [weitere Beihilfe], by which is 
meant extra-musical elements such as words. Nietzsche, therefore, is claiming that music is able 
to take on the function of language and express meaning even if it is not accompanied by language. 
This is a direct counter to Wagner’s claim that language and dance must accompany music if music 
is to express meaning.12  
We can now see that Nietzsche takes on one of Wagner’s views about absolute music, but 
nevertheless rejects another. Nietzsche agrees with Wagner that autonomous music is unable to 
express the absolute, something which transcends language, distancing himself from Romantic 
views of absolute music. Nevertheless, Nietzsche calls into question Wagner’s claim that a 
                                                 
12 Dahlhaus (1974) notes that at times Wagner seems to admit that instrumental music can express 
what dance and words express without being accompanied by either. However, Dahlhaus argues 
that this is because Wagner is trying to reconcile his own views about the Musikdrama with the 
views of Arthur Schopenhauer, a philosopher who defends instrumental music’s unique ability to 
express the absolute, or, specifically in Schopenhauer’s case, the “will.” However, even with these 
attempts at reconciliation, Wagner never clearly admits that instrumental music can independently 
express what dance and words express, and he never gives up his views about the Musikdrama and 
its superiority over instrumental music.  
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Musikdrama, a unity of music with language and other art forms, is necessary for music to express 
meaning. Rather, Nietzsche believed that music can express linguistic meaning without being 
accompanied by language. In order to understand how this could be possible, we must turn to the 
preceding aphorism.  
4 APHORISM 215: NIETZSCHE’S ACCOUNT OF ABSOLUTE MUSIC 
In aphorism 215, Nietzsche provides a hypothesis about the origins of absolute music. Put 
simply, his hypothesis states that music is able to express linguistic meaning without language 
because music had been accompanied by poetry for millennia. As a result, the linguistic meaning 
of poetry became associated with various musical sounds and elements. Eventually, listeners 
would think of the linguistic meanings that had long been associated with certain musical sounds 
and elements, even if they were no longer accompanied by poetry.  
Nietzsche’s hypothesis draws on two prominent views about absolute music in nineteenth-
century Germany and from Wagner’s own account of how humans’ reactions to sound [Ton] 
developed historically. The first view emphasized that music is a “language of emotion” [Sprache 
des Gefühls], a phrase employed by Friedrich Schlegel. This language “operates on principles 
beyond words, reasons, and concepts” (Bonds 2014: 114). This view focused on the meaning of 
the emotions evoked by music, and how these emotions revealed the nature of the absolute.13  
The second view, which is likely drawn from Eduard Hanslick’s On the Musically 
Beautiful (1854), focused on the way in which absolute music’s formal qualities, such as harmony 
and tempo, allowed music to express the absolute. Whereas the first view focused on the emotions 
                                                 
13 For an expression of this view, see Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s fifth Symphony 
(Hoffmann 1977). 
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evoked in the listener, this second view focused on the formal principles of music and the way in 
which various sounds produced pleasure and displeasure in the listener.14   
The third view that is influential in Nietzsche’s hypothesis comes from Wagner.15 
Influenced by Hegel, who had provided a historical account for the development of art, Wagner 
provides an account of how humans’ reactions to sound changes throughout history. Wagner 
further claims that at the final stage of this development, humans are able to integrate all the ways 
in which previous humans reacted to music, which correlates with the unification of all the arts in 
the Musikdrama, a Wagnerian form of drama that would unify music, poetry, and dance. 
Wagner claims that there are four key stages in the development of humans’ reaction to 
sound. In the first stage, humans react to sound based on the bodily sensations such sounds produce 
in the listener, namely pleasure and displeasure. Wagner names humans who relate to sound in this 
way “bodily people” [Leibesmenschen], emphasizing the visceral nature of this reaction. In the 
second stage, humans react to sound based on the general emotions [allgemeine Gefühle] various 
sounds evoke in the listener.16 Such humans are referred to as “people of emotion” 
                                                 
14 Whether Hanslick’s view actually implies that absolute music, formally understood, expresses 
the absolute is debated to this day. Dahlhaus maintained that it does, but others, such as Bonds 
(2014) and Landerer and Rotharb (2018) have noted the changes Hanslick made in new editions 
to call attention away from music’s relationship to the absolute and his infrequent use of the term 
“absolute” in his work, both of which seem to downplay his belief in music’s relationship to the 
absolute. Nevertheless, Bonds notes that Hanslick was unable to fully avoid admitting that music 
bears some relationship to the absolute.  
15 The following is drawn from pp. 32-35 in Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft in Wagner, Richard (1983) 
Dichtungen und Schriften, Vol. 11, pp. 9-157. 
16 Wagner claims that at this stage only general emotions, emotions that are vague and are not 
made precise by concepts, are experienced by the listener. Only when language accompanies sound 
can sound evoke particular emotions [besondere Gefühle]. The distinction between general and 
particular emotions in Wagner’s account not only offers a more precise account of emotions 
evoked by music in comparison to earlier thinkers such as Hoffmann, but also shows how even if 
music can evoke general emotions without language, language is still required for music to 
communicate concepts.  
15 
[Gefühlsmenschen]. Once language is combined with sound, humans enter into a new stage, in 
which they react to sound (combined with language) based on what is signified, that is, based on 
what they understand [verstehen]. Wagner calls such humans “people of understanding” 
[Verstandesmenschen]. Most important is the final stage, in which humans of all preceding stages 
of history (Leibesmench, Gefühlsmensch, and Verstandesmensch), each with a distinct way of 
reacting to sound, are unified in a new stage of humans that react to sound such that all previously 
described ways are integrated with one another. This final stage of humans correlates with the 
development of the Musikdrama, an artwork that provides all relevant artistic aspects (including 
sound and language) such that the listener can simultaneously react to sound in all three ways: by 
sensation, emotion, and understanding.  
As the reader may have noted, the first and second stages of Wagner’s account share 
similarities with the formal view and the view that music is a language of emotion described at the 
beginning of this section. The key difference between Wagner’s account and these other views 
from thinkers such as Hanslick and Hoffmann is that for Wagner the formal view and the “emotion-
centered” view are individually deficient; they do not encompass all the ways in which humans 
react to sound. Only when sensation, emotion, and understanding are integrated does sound, as a 
component of the Musikdrama, fulfill its expressive potential. A consequence of this view is that 
the expressive capacity of “absolute music,” insofar as it is not accompanied by language, is itself 
deficient; independent of language sound does not signify anything, but only evokes sensations 
and general emotions. Even more important, the formal view and emotion-centered view only refer 
to ways of reacting to sound that are precursors to the final stage in which the listener reacts more 
holistically to the Musikdrama.  
16 
Nietzsche’s own, deceptively short, hypothesis about the origins of absolute music draws 
from all three views. Taking up Wagner’s historical framework, Nietzsche places both the formal 
view and the emotion-centered view at different points in the development of music and 
reinterprets them through this placement. Where Nietzsche locates each view in the development 
of music is critical for understanding his hypothesis: 
‘Absolute music’ is either form in itself, at a primitive stage [im rohen Zustand] of 
music in which sounds made in tempo and at varying volume gave [macht] pleasure 
as such, or symbolism of form speaking to the understanding without poetry [die 
schon zum Verständnis redende Symbolik der Formen] after both arts had been 
united over a long course of evolution [in langer Entwicklung] and the musical form 
had finally become enmeshed in threads of feeling and concepts. (HH 215) 
 
Similar to Hanslick’s view, which claims that the absolute is expressed through music’s 
formal qualities, in the first disjunct Nietzsche refers to music that is enjoyed solely for its formal 
elements, such as tempo and volume. Nietzsche locates music of this kind at an earlier stage in 
musical evolution.17 This type of music does not evoke emotions or concepts, but simply evokes 
pleasure or displeasure in the listener. The second disjunct refers to music in which formal 
elements have become combined with emotions [Gefühle] and concepts [Begriffe]. Nietzsche 
refers to these concepts and emotions as symbolic content [Symbolik].18 
Symbolic content in music refers to concepts that are evoked by various musical elements. 
When we listen to music with symbolic content, this music arouses certain sensations that in turn 
                                                 
17 The reader should note that both “evolution” and “development” are translations of the same 
term, Entwicklung, in the German text of Wagner and Nietzsche. I will try to keep this as consistent 
as possible, but I will draw the English term from the English translations of Wagner and 
Nietzsche.  
18 It is interesting that Nietzsche collapses stages two and three in Wagner’s account, the division 
between the Gefühlsmensch and the Verstandesmensch. This could be an intentional move, by 
means of which Nietzsche may be challenging Wagner’s distinction of emotions and concepts, 
both in terms of their respective position in historical development of how humans react to sound 
and in terms of the relationship emotions have to understanding, or for Nietzsche, the intellect. I 
leave this consideration open for now, in the hope that it may prove fruitful in future research. 
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conjure up concepts in us. The symbolic content, and the sensations to which they are indexed, are 
brought about by various formal elements of music; different formal structures (such as a specific 
sequence of chords) are associated with different symbolic content. For example, I may listen to 
an instrumental version of the melody from “Dies Irae.”19 This specific melody conjures up the 
concepts of “death” and “damnation”; “death” and “damnation” are indexed to this melody. The 
emotions that this melody evokes in the listener, such as fear, are a response to the concepts 
associated with this melody. The musical sounds themselves do not cause the emotion of fear, but 
the symbolic content that is indexed to these musical sounds causes it.  
Nietzsche locates this second kind of music, in which symbolic content is indexed to 
sounds (symbolic absolute music), at a later stage in the evolution of music, specifically in the 
modern age, including the nineteenth century.  At this point in time, Nietzsche claims, listeners 
are not responding to the formal aspects of music in themselves, but are instead reacting to the 
concepts that are evoked by various musical sounds. Nietzsche therefore seems to reject the idea 
that listeners in his era can respond solely to music’s formal qualities, since by this time concepts 
and emotions have been mixed into the sounds themselves. Nietzsche then focuses his attention 
on symbolic absolute music. HH offers a hypothetical etiology in order to explain how concepts 
became indexed to formal elements of music. 
Nietzsche begins by pointing out that music used to be accompanied by poetry. The sounds 
of music were perceived simultaneously with poetry, and therefore such sounds were perceived 
along with the symbolic content of poetry. The simultaneous perception of poetry and music led 
listeners to associate the symbolic content of poetry not just with the words, but with the musical 
                                                 
19 Let us assume for the sake of example, that I do not know or understand the title associated with 
this melody but am only aware of the sounds present in the melody.  
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sounds that accompanied the words. Eventually, listeners were able to make the associations even 
without the words. If music had not been accompanied by poetry for such a long time, then the 
symbolic content would never have been associated with, and finally attributed to, the sounds 
themselves. Following this hypothesis, Nietzsche’s claim that absolute music is “understood 
symbolically” does not mean that absolute music has symbolic content inherently. This phrase 
simply but sharply conveys that this symbolic content was a historical import from poetry, from 
an extra-musical source.  
The parallels between Nietzsche’s historical hypothesis and Wagner’s own historical 
account are hard to ignore. Both claim that humans first reacted to sound based on the sensations 
it produced in the listener, and later in history humans reacted to sound based on the emotions it 
produced in the listener. Both also discuss how the combination of language with sound brought 
about a new stage in the way humans reacted to sound. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s hypothesis differs from Wagner’s view on two key points. First, 
as briefly noted in the previous section, Nietzsche claims that over time various sounds eventually 
come to have symbolic content without being accompanied by language. Therefore, humans are 
able to understand the symbolic content in music even when no language is present. This is not 
possible in Wagner’s account because humans are able to understand music only when language 
is present. For Nietzsche symbolic absolute music is actually preceded and enabled by artistic 
works that combine sound and language, including songs and opera. Nietzsche is likely implicating 
Wagner’s own special dramas when he refers to dramatic works. With this in mind, it seems as 
though Nietzsche is implicitly challenging Wagner’s view that the Musikdrama is the artwork of 
the future, an artwork that will supplant “absolute music.” Instead, “absolute music,” at the very 
least symbolic absolute music, is that which occurs after works that combine sound and language.  
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The second key point on which Nietzsche’s hypothesis differs from Wagner’s is that 
Nietzsche does not commit himself to a “final stage” during which the various ways in which 
humans react to music are integrated with one another. Not only does Nietzsche’s hypothesis 
distinctly lack any mention of such a stage, parts of his hypothesis imply that this final stage would 
not be possible. Nietzsche notes how humans at different stages of development would each hear 
the same piece of music in different ways (one formally, feeling pleasure and displeasure, the other 
reacting to the emotions and concepts such a piece evokes).  Based on how each human animal is 
constituted at its particular stage of development, Nietzsche seems to imply that a human at one 
stage of development would be unable to react to sound the way someone at another stage of 
development would. The specific reasons why Nietzsche does not commit himself to a final stage 
in his historical hypothesis and rejects the possibility of integrating the various ways in which 
humans react to sound will become clear after examining aphorism 217. In light of its importance 
both for Wagner’s account and for the role it plays in relation to Wagner’s Musikdramen, it is 
important to note how Nietzsche is already implicitly calling such an integration into question.  
Furthermore, the strong division between humans who have different ways of reacting to 
sounds in Nietzsche’s hypothesis demonstrates the influence of the formal and emotion-centered 
views. Both the formal view and emotion-centered view of absolute music reject the claim that 
humans are able to simultaneously react to sound in different ways, such as a simultaneous reaction 
to sound based on the sensations and the emotions it produces in the listener. Nietzsche’s account 
similarly rejects the claim that humans can simultaneously react to sounds based on the sensations 
and the emotions they produce in the listener.20 However, Wagner’s account attempts to show how 
                                                 
20 Hanslick (1986) demonstrates this powerfully in his work On the Musically Beautiful, in which 
the first chapter title, “The Aesthetics of Feeling”, which portrays the emotion-centered view, is 
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the claim that both views are incommensurable is misguided. Rather than accepting that music is 
either simply a matter of emotion or of formal properties, Wagner claims that reactions to sound 
based on emotions and formal properties are merely parts of the holistic way in which humans 
listen to music. Therefore, Wagner does not reject the emotion-centered view in favor of a formal 
view, or vice versa.  Wagner rejects the basis of the debate. In 215 Nietzsche reintroduces the 
debate that Wagner rejected; the emotion-centered view and the formal view of music are 
incommensurable. Using Wagner’s own views against him, Nietzsche combines the 
incommensurability of these views with Wagner’s historical interpretation. Both views are 
incommensurable because they both are related to different historical stages of human 
development, calling into question Wagner’s attempt to integrate reactions to music based on 
sensation and emotion.21 
There are four further consequences of this hypothesis that will impact Nietzsche’s 
investigation and evaluation of absolute music in HH 217.  
5 FOUR CONSEQUENCES OF NIETZSCHE’S HYPOTHESIS 
The first consequence of Nietzsche’s hypothesis is that absolute music is not autonomous 
after all; it has content, but it does not have its content inherently. Absolute music would have 
symbolic content inherently if the concepts and emotions that were brought about by listening to 
music were necessarily evoked in the listener by various musical elements. This is because the 
symbolic content of music would be part of the music, not a projection of the listener onto the 
                                                 
bluntly followed by a chapter titled, “The ‘Representation of Feelings’ is Not the Content of 
Music”.  
21 The influence of the emotion-centered view and the formal view is further supported by the fact 
that Nietzsche refers to both the historical stage when humans reacted to sound formally and the 
historical stage when humans reacted to sound based on emotion as one possible meaning of 
“absolute music,” a phrase that Wagner does not ascribe to any stage of his historical account, but 
this term was prominent in the formal and emotion-centered views. 
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music.  Whenever one listened to music, one would perceive the symbolic content that the music 
contained. One would also be unable to listen to music without perceiving its symbolic content. 
Furthermore, everyone would perceive the same symbolic content from the same piece of music. 
Returning to the example above, if “death” and “damnation,” were necessarily indexed to the 
melody of “Dies Irae,” then whenever one listened to this melody, one would think of “death” and 
“damnation.” One would be unable to listen to this melody without perceiving this symbolic 
content. However, because the symbolic content of absolute music is the result of music’s ancient 
association with poetry, the specific symbolic content of a specific combination of musical 
elements (such as a chord progression) is the result of the symbolic content of poetry with which 
this combination was associated. As a result, the connection of specific symbolic content to 
specific musical sounds is not necessary, but contingent, dependent on the various ways sounds 
were paired with the symbolic content of poetry. Therefore, the symbolic content one perceives 
when one listens to music is not indexed necessarily to the sounds of the music. This first 
consequence already demonstrates that “absolute music” is, for Nietzsche, not in fact absolute. 
Music could qualify as absolute only if it were autonomous, but the “absolute” music his 
contemporaries have in mind in fact depends on an extra-musical element, poetry. 
The second consequence of Nietzsche’s hypothesis is that it challenges the possibility that 
someone can passively listen to music. Listening to music would be passive if the listener simply 
perceived without distortion, alteration, or addition the symbolic content that was already 
contained in the music. If this were the case, then when one listened to music, one would be unable 
to affect the symbolic content that the music contained; such symbolic content would be the result 
of the musical elements themselves, not of the listener’s associations. The first consequence shows 
that the symbolic content of music does not originally arise from music’s formal elements but is 
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actually drawn from poetry. But Nietzsche goes further and claims that the symbolic content of 
music depends on the intellect [Intellekt] of the listener: “It was the intellect itself which first 
introduced [hineingelegt] this significance into sounds” (HH 215). While the symbolic content of 
music is drawn from poetry, it is the listener who associates the symbolic content of poetry with 
the music and eventually attributes such symbolic content to the music independent of poetry. The 
symbolic content that the listener associates with the sound is not at the whim of the listener, but 
derived from the historical association over centuries, if not millennia. The listener’s intellect plays 
a necessary role in the formation of such an association. Without the intellect playing an active 
role, no association would occur, and the purely formal structures of music would cease having 
connections to symbolic content.  
The third consequence of Nietzsche’s hypothesis is that the intellect’s role when listening 
to music changes dramatically over the course of human history. In aphorism 215 Nietzsche 
describes two kinds of humans, those who have remained behind [zurückgeblieben sind] in the 
development of music, and those who are advanced [die Fortgeschrittenen]. Both would react to 
the same piece of music in different ways. The former humans would understand [empfinden] the 
piece of music in a purely formalistic way. At an earlier stage in musical evolution, humans 
perceived sound in a purely formalistic way, that is, without any symbolic content. At this stage, 
no symbolic content was attributed to sounds. Therefore, there was nothing for the intellect of such 
listeners to understand when perceiving sounds by themselves; the intellect played no evident role 
when listening to sounds by themselves. Instead, listeners would simply sense symbolically empty 
sounds and react to the pleasurable or displeasurable sensations that the sounds produced. 
When sounds were presented side by side with poetry, the intellect, already playing a role 
in understanding the symbolic content of the words, began to play a role when listening to sounds. 
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Once listeners began to attribute the symbolic content of poetry to the sounds themselves, the 
intellect began to play a role in the perception of sounds by themselves; listeners could then 
understand sounds. Listening to the same piece of music as those atavistic types who relate to 
music merely formally, these advanced humans would react to it based on the emotions and 
concepts it evoked. Whereas the former group only senses [empfinden] sounds and as a result 
experiences some kind of pleasure or pain, those who are advanced understand [verstehen] 
sounds.22 Therefore, the intellect’s role in listening to sounds by themselves changed.  
The final consequence of Nietzsche’s hypothesis mirrors Wagner’s reaction to absolute 
music, in its rejection of absolute music’s ability to reveal the absolute. Because Nietzsche 
attributes the significance of absolute music to symbolic content that is established by a longtime 
association with poetry, what “absolute music” signifies is not immediate and necessary but is 
instead dependent on language. Though listeners themselves are unaware of the origin of the 
symbolic content of absolute music, so that they may think of it as autonomous, such music still 
fails to be autonomous because it draws its symbolic content from an extra-musical source. 
Furthermore, because the significance of absolute music is the result of accompanying language, 
such as poetry, absolute music’s significance is derived from language.23 Therefore, the 
significance of absolute music is confined to the significance of language. Because the significance 
of absolute content is derived from and limited to the significance of language, the “absolute” that 
                                                 
22 R. J. Hollingdale (1996) translates both “empfinden” and “verstehen” as “to understand,” but it 
is crucial to separate these two terms in order to appreciate fully the different ways in which 
listeners can listen to sounds. “Empfinden” should be translated as “to sense.” Nietzsche often uses 
it in order to designate the involvement of the senses. “Verstehen” refers to thought and should be 
translated as “to understand.” This distinction will become key in aphorism 217.  
23 Music did not simply take on the meanings of Greek language and preserve them for thousands 
of years. Other language sources, such as medieval chants, accompanied and changed the symbolic 
content of music. The impact of Christianity on the symbolic content of music will be directly 
addressed in the last section.   
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absolute music supposedly reveals does not transcend language; it does not refer to some ineffable 
and ultimate reality. 
6 APHORISM 217: THE INTELLECT AND THE SENSES 
In aphorism 217 Nietzsche calls attention to the increasing role of the listener’s intellect 
and the decreasing role of the senses. He claims that the listener’s ears have become “intellectual,” 
a change that he attributes to the extraordinary [außerordentlich] exercise of the listener’s intellect. 
He seems to imply that the sense organs themselves are able to think, stating that “[t]he more 
capable of thought [gedankenfähiger] eye and ear become, the closer they approach the point at 
which they become unsensual [unsinnlich]” (HH 217). Using the consequences drawn from 
Nietzsche’s hypothesis in aphorism 215, we can better understand his otherwise peculiar 
description of the sense organs. 
As described above, the role of the intellect changed over the course of music’s evolution. 
At an earlier stage in this evolution the intellect played no role when one listened to sounds 
unaccompanied by words. Instead, the listener simply sensed symbolically empty sounds, and 
reacted to such sounds based on whether they were pleasing or displeasing.24 At a later stage, the 
listener began by means of association to attribute symbolic content to the sounds themselves. At 
this point, the listener no longer simply sensed symbolically empty sounds, but reacted both to the 
sensations created by these sounds, and the symbolic content attributed to these sounds; the listener 
became unable to separate sensing a sound from grasping its symbolic content. When Nietzsche 
refers to an “intellectual” ear or an ear “capable of thought,” he is referring to the listener’s inability 
to separate sensing a sound from understanding its symbolic content. However, Nietzsche’s claim 
                                                 
24 For example, a loud dissonant chord, independent of any symbolic content, would be displeasing 
because of the discomfort it causes the listener.  
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in aphorism 217 is not that the listener has become unable to separate sensing a sound from 
understanding the symbolic content of a sound. Rather, the key point is that the listener’s intellect 
is becoming more and more active, which impacts both how the listener understands sounds, and 
how a listener senses sounds. 
The increasing role of the intellect has two related consequences. First, with a more active 
intellect, the listener pays closer attention to the symbolic content of sounds, and increasingly 
values sounds based on whether they have pleasing symbolic content. The listener even actively 
searches out the content of a musical work. Second, the listener, increasingly focused on the 
symbolic content of sounds, focuses less on the sensations that the sounds produce. While the 
listener increasingly values sounds because he takes them to have symbolic content, he becomes 
increasingly indifferent to whether the sensations the sounds make are pleasurable or 
displeasurable. “For the moment we still believe: the world is uglier than ever, but it signifies a 
more beautiful world than there has ever been” (HH 217). Even admitting to the ugliness of the 
sensations that modern music brings about, Nietzsche notes that the modern listener does not care 
about the beauty of the sensations, but the beauty of what the sounds signify. The senses become 
instrumentally valuable to the intellect; the senses allow the listener to understand the symbolic 
content of sounds but are not valued because of the sensations they produce.   
Two examples show how this change has impacted the listener. First, Nietzsche says, the 
listener is able to tolerate music that listeners with a less active intellect would have found 
unbearable. An active intellect allows a listener to understand and enjoy what symbolic content he 
believes he finds in music (such as sublimity [Erhabene]) even if the sounds produce displeasing 
sensations, such as in music that is much louder and full of dissonance. Listeners who would react 
to sounds based on the sensations they produce would have been unable to enjoy such music 
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because of the displeasurable sensations it makes and because they would not have understood its 
symbolic content. Second, with a more active intellect, the capabilities of the listener’s senses have 
suffered. The listener is no longer able to make fine-grained distinctions in the sensations that 
sounds produce that listeners with less active intellects could distinguish, such as the difference 
between a C sharp and D flat. 
Nietzsche claims that the senses are becoming “unsensual” because the sensations that 
sounds produce are becoming less important, and the senses are becoming valuable only insofar 
as they enable the viewer to understand the symbolic content of sound. 
7 APHORISM 217: NIETZSCHE’S EVALUATION OF ABSOLUTE MUSIC 
After discussing the changing role of the intellect and the senses, Nietzsche turns in 
aphorism 217 to the way such music affects how the listener values life. The modern listener with 
his active intellect focuses more on the symbolic content of sounds, and the enjoyment that he 
draws from music is based on what he takes the symbolic content of the music to be. At the same 
time, as the listener’s senses become weaker, and he ascribes less significance to them, he relies 
on them less and becomes increasingly indifferent to the sensations music produces. Furthermore, 
the listener becomes less able to enjoy music based on the sensations it produces. Eventually, he 
is able to enjoy music only based on its symbolic content. Through this process the views of such 
thinkers such as E.T.A. Hoffmann may be understood in a new light. The increasing role of the 
intellect and decreasing role of the senses permit the listener to experience what seems to him to 
be an “absolute” expressed through music, and to be transported away from his sense-experience. 
The stage is set for absolute music to have its fullest impact.  
At the end of aphorism 217 Nietzsche considers the next stage in the evolution of music. 
“Thus there is in Germany a twofold current of musical evolution: On the one hand a host of ten 
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thousand with ever higher, more refined demands, listening ever more intently for the ‘meaning’, 
and on the other the enormous majority growing every year more and more incapable of 
comprehending the meaningful even in the form of the sensually ugly.” Listeners are divided into 
two groups. The first, an ever-shrinking minority will continue to derive enjoyment from music 
based on what they think it signifies, its symbolic content. This symbolic content that music 
expresses will become more and more complex, which in turn will make it more and more difficult 
to understand, and an increasing number of listeners will be unable to understand the symbolic 
content of music. These confused listeners will soon try to enjoy the ugly sensations for their own 
sake, “learning to seize with greater and greater contentment the ugly and disgusting in itself, that 
is to say the basely sensual, in music” (HH 217).  
7.1 The Enormous Majority 
For the enormous majority, the only way they can enjoy music is by returning to the 
sensations that such music produces. However, they will also be unable to enjoy modern music in 
this regard. “[T]he more attenuated the fragrant odour of ‘significance’ becomes, the fewer there 
will be still able to perceive [wahrnehmen] it: and the rest will finally be left with the ugly, which 
they will try to enjoy directly—an endeavor in which they are bound to fail [immer mißlingen 
muß]” (HH 217). There are two main reasons why listeners who attempt to enjoy music based on 
the sensations it produces because they cannot understand what it conveys, are bound to fail. First, 
the music available and being produced at this time in Germany is displeasurable to the senses. 
Music had been composed for an audience with an active intellect. This means that music was 
created such that it had edifying symbolic content, often with the result that it was increasingly 
displeasurable, if not disgusting, to the senses. Listeners then, trying to enjoy music that they 
ceased to understand, are left with sensations that are ugly, that is, displeasing to the senses. 
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Second, the senses of most, if not all, listeners and humans in general have become blunt and 
feeble, such that listeners are unable to sense the various nuances that could allow one to enjoy 
music independent of its symbolic content. The majority of listeners have become people who can 
only search for and appreciate the symbolic content of music but are unable to appreciate the 
sensually beautiful. As a result, the two avenues by which one can enjoy music, by the sensations 
it produces and by the symbolic content it contains, are closed off to the majority.  
7.2 The “Ten Thousand” 
Whereas absolute music fails to help the enormous multitude of listeners affirm life 
because they are unable to understand its symbolic content, the elite “ten thousand” are able to 
understand music. However, simply understanding the symbolic content of absolute music does 
not help listeners affirm life. In fact, what they understand in music, the expression of an 
“absolute,” and the fact that they value this over sensible experience, shows that those who 
understand are no better off than those who do not. 
Just as music inherited symbolic content from poetry in antiquity, so did music inherit 
symbolic content from Christianity throughout the Middle Ages and the following centuries. The 
issue at play then is not simply that music inherited symbolic content, but the specific kind of 
symbolic content it inherited from Christianity—the desire for some metaphysical reality beyond 
the sensible world in which we live, a precursor to the ascetic ideal.  Nietzsche directly addresses 
this desire in “The Religious Life,” the chapter directly preceding his discussion of art and music.  
In aphorism 114 Nietzsche claims that at the basis of Christianity lies the rejection of oneself in 
favor of some divine ideal, a belief that animates all emotions and principles within Christianity. 
In modern music, this belief takes on a new content, the absolute; the desire for a divine ideal in 
Christianity becomes a desire for experiencing the “absolute” that transcends thoughts and 
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language through music. This transference of ideals from Christianity to music is by no means a 
thing of the past. Nietzsche points to the recent transference of religious ideals into music in 
aphorism 219, in which he notes how the Counterreformation, which brought about a “profoundly 
religious conversion” [tiefreligiöse Umstimmung] in humans, deeply changed the nature of modern 
music; modern music was born from the ascetic ideals which Nietzsche had just ascribed to 
Christianity. Absolute music, as a continuation of the ascetic ideal, is a symptom of a desire for a 
reality beyond the sensible world.  
That his contemporary artists use music as a vehicle for ascetic ideals allows us to 
understand the full ramifications of Nietzsche’s description of the effect of absolute music in 
aphorism 217: “For the moment we still believe: the world is uglier than ever, but it signifies 
[bedeutet] a more beautiful world than there has ever been” (HH 217). The world signified by 
music’s symbolic content is not the sensible world, but an ideal world which the refined few 
eagerly pursue and enjoy by listening to absolute music. But the consequence of this is that the 
world in which they actually live, the sensible world, is rejected in favor of this ideal world. 
Therefore, absolute music does not help these elite listeners in affirming life, but rather 
encourages their rejection of it in favor of some otherworldly ideal, of what seems to be an 
“absolute” that such listeners are now able to hear in the music in virtue of their tremendous 
intellects. However, even these dark consequences fail to register the full impact of Nietzsche’s 
concern with absolute music. An even more select group, the free spirits, those who can recognize 
the ascetic ideals hidden in music, are nevertheless tempted by absolute music to return to these 
ideals and revel in them. In aphorism 153 Nietzsche notes how the free spirit is enticed by the 
metaphysical urge by listening to music. The defining aspects that make such spirits free are 
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threatened by listening to such music, through which they are tempted to return to the enjoyment 
of music at the expense of life-affirming ideals.25 
Absolute music then tempts the very few remaining who might be able to challenge the 
rejection of life that it promulgates. Those that could affirm life by some other avenue are drawn 
back in and are encouraged to reject life with the help of absolute music.  
8 CONCLUSION 
This ominous consequence is what Nietzsche considers when he evaluates “absolute 
music.”  “Absolute music” has become a form of music with extremely complex symbolic content, 
it produces few pleasurable sensations, and it brings a new persuasive voice to the ascetic ideal. 
Most are unable to enjoy what absolute music signifies and are forced to attempt to enjoy the 
displeasurable sensations it produces, but this will result in failure. Those that can understand and 
enjoy the symbolic content do not affirm life, but instead remain in thrall to the ascetic ideal, 
rejecting life in favor of some higher metaphysical reality. And the very few who may be able to 
challenge it, under which we may include Nietzsche himself, are continuously tempted to return 
to its ascetic ideals whenever they listen to it. This means that absolute music cannot help the 
listener affirm life, for there is nothing enjoyable he can draw from it to offset the suffering of life. 
Such music increasingly forces the listener to struggle with its meaning and its ugliness, leaving 
the listener disappointed and confused. The supposed beauty and transcendence such music aims 
to bring to the listeners either fails or encourages him to turn away from himself, and the listener 
                                                 
25 In aphorism 153 Nietzsche uses Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony as an example of music that 
tempts the free spirit. Due to the fact that it includes words in its fourth movement, it is not, strictly 
speaking, “absolute” music. However, I hold that it is not the fact that this music has words that 
makes it tempting, rather it, like many genuine pieces of absolute music, encourages following the 
ascetic ideal. Therefore, we should be permitted to consider any piece of absolute music as 
tempting the free spirit in a similar way.  
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is better off covering up his ears than attempting to gain something from it. Absolute music has 
become a dead-end for the affirmation of life.  
With these ominous words I once again draw the reader’s attention to Wagner. Even though 
Wagner tasked himself with saving music burdened by a Christian past, and at times claimed that 
he was overcoming absolute music, his music remains vulnerable to Nietzsche’s critique. The 
Musikdrama, Wagner’s “artwork of the future,” does not in fact overcome absolute music. Instead, 
it is an inheritor of absolute music (of the long-established symbolic content present in music, 
which holds onto Christian values). Wagner’s “new works,” which attempt to combine sound and 
language, are in fact building on a basis of sound that is itself already impregnated with Christian 
values. Wagner’s own Musikdramen then inevitably can only inherit, and not overcome such 
values. Not only does Wagner’s work perpetuate the same values because the sounds with which 
the Musikdrama is built already contain implicit symbolic content derived from Christianity, but 
the listener still possesses an active intellect, causing him to listen for symbolic content and not 
pay attention to the impact of such works on his senses, contributing to his inability to affirm life 
even with supposedly revolutionary works of art.  
However, before this point be taken too far, we must remind ourselves that Nietzsche’s 
criticism of Wagner is derived from Wagner’s own ideas. Far from being a wholesale rejection of 
Wagner, Nietzsche’s critique of absolute music in HH is derived from Wagner’s own hypothesis 
about the historical development of meaning in music. The fact that Nietzsche’s attack on absolute 
music includes Wagner in its scopes does not establish a strict ideological break between Nietzsche 
had with this former friend, it only complicates it. We must look more carefully at the transition 
between HH and the works that precede it, ensuring that Nietzsche’s break from Wagner does not 
lead us to believe that Nietzsche’s views in HH are a break with all of Wagner’s views. In fact, to 
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best understand this break, we must understand the Wagnerian-influenced views that Nietzsche 
maintains between earlier works such as BT and HH. 
Some may be tempted still, seeing Nietzsche’s rejection of absolute music and Wagner, to 
nevertheless claim that Nietzsche is urging for a different kind of music, one unburdened by 
otherworldly ideals and which could actually help listeners to affirm life. In line with this claim, 
the issue is not with absolute music in general, but with specific artists, such as Wagner and his 
predecessors. This view becomes problematic in light of the changing roles of the listener’s 
intellect and senses described above, and the long-term historical development of these changes. I 
have already noted that Nietzsche’s critique of absolute music does not simply address the music, 
but the construction of the listener’s own intellect and senses; the listener now seeks out the 
symbolic meaning of music on his own. Therefore, changing the music alone would at the very 
least offer no immediate solution. What further makes the view that Nietzsche is only attacking 
certain artists suspect is the fact that the development and transition to absolute music is a process 
occurring over centuries, if not millennia. While discussing Nietzsche’s historical treatment of 
morality in HH, Franco (2011) notes that even if one were to become aware of the conditions of 
morality’s historical development, this would not thereby enable him to do away with this 
inheritance; one would still be subject to the various moral prejudices that have arisen over 
thousands of years. I would claim that this applies to art and the ideals that it propagates as well, 
especially when considering the connection Nietzsche draws between art and its connections to 
otherworldly ideals in HH. Just as one cannot simply disinherit the prejudices of morality, a 
historical development that itself can greatly change over another great stretch of history, so can 
one not delete the otherworldly prejudices of absolute music by making new pieces. A “new 
music” that would grace the stage of Bayreuth simply does not suffice, be it by Wagner or not.  
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Finally, I will note that this interpretation of Nietzsche creates certain issues for those who 
try to claim that Nietzsche is a thinker who prizes art and its ability to help us affirm life.26 These 
interpretations emphasize either that Nietzsche’s views about art in HH are a fluke which he 
abandons in later works or are not as extreme as I have presented them here. By following through 
Nietzsche’s critique of absolute music, I have shown that far from attacking a few artists, 
Nietzsche’s critique of absolute music draws upon his greater concern with otherworldly values 
inherited from Christianity and his examination of the intellectual and physiological make-up of 
the listener. Those who maintain that we should take Nietzsche as a supporter of art’s ability to 
affirm life, at least in regard to music, must then demonstrate why we should dismiss Nietzsche’s 
extreme view about absolute music in HH, even when it is tied to views that would motivate most 
of his later works, especially his critique of ascetic ideals. Those who wish to claim that his views 
about absolute music are not as extreme as I have presented them here must likewise show why 
we should take up Nietzsche’s genealogical method and views on the sense-organs, both topics 
which will animate his later work as well, but discard his critique of absolute music. In either case, 
Nietzsche’s critique of absolute music in HH offers a troubling account for his relationship to 
music, both in regard to how much he valued or distrusted music, and what positive or potentially 
nefarious role it plays in his continuous offensive against otherworldly values.  
  
                                                 
26 Cf. Pothen (2002), Ridley (2007), and Meyer (2019) for examples of these views. 
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